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Bringing “an end to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Britain” was one of
Theresa May’s famous red lines in the EU withdrawal negotiations. And judging by
the debate in the House of Commons on 15 November, many MPs are of the opinion
that the draft Withdrawal Agreement (WA) has failed to respect it. This particular
red line was always going to be a problem for the prime minister: After all, the
UK’s commitment to comply with certain EU rules (on citizens’ rights, customs etc)
would inevitably mean that the ECJ’s interpretations of these rules would have to
be binding on the UK. It is thus no surprise that the WA provides for the jurisdiction
of the ECJ in various places; what is perhaps more of a surprise – and surely a
negotiation win for the UK – is the EU’s concession of an arbitration mechanism to
resolve inter-party disputes over the interpretation of the WA.
The aim of this blog post is twofold: first to outline the various questions over which
the ECJ will retain jurisdiction after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; and second
to argue that it is doubtful whether the arbitration mechanism is compatible with EU
law.
A member state in all but name
Ending the jurisdiction of the ECJ was always going to be a difficult task for the UK’s
negotiators if they wanted the EU-UK relationship to be based on common (i.e. in
practice EU) rules. After all, Articles 19 TEU and 344 TFEU have been interpreted
to result in its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret Union law, at least as far as it takes
effect within the Union (more on this later). Given that the WA envisages a standstill
transition period – during which the UK will be subjected to EU law like a Member
State in all but name – and a “single customs territory” based on Union law for the
time after transition, unless a free trade agreement is in place that would avoid a
hard border on the island of Ireland a role for the ECJ with effect for the UK was
going to be nigh impossible to avoid.
We can therefore find numerous references to a continued role of the ECJ in the UK
after Brexit:
1) It goes (almost) without saying that the ECJ’s jurisdiction will continue as it is now
during the transition period (Article 131 WA).
But even after transition, the ECJ and its case law will continue to play an important
role in the UK. First, its case law up until the end of the transition period will remain
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binding on the UK; post-transition case law will have to be given due regard (Article 4
WA).
2) The ECJ will continue to have jurisdiction over cases pending before it when the
transition period ends (Article 86 WA) and over new enforcement actions brought
within four years after the end of transition provided the UK’s violation occurred
before then (article 87 WA).
3) As far as the citizens’ rights part of the WA is concerned, UK courts will continue
to be in a position to refer cases to the ECJ over the interpretation of that part of the
agreement for eight years following the end of transition (Article 158 WA).
4) The ECJ will retain jurisdiction over large parts of the Protocol on Northern Ireland
(the ‘backstop’ contained in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland). According to
Article 14 (4) of the Protocol, the ECJ will have jurisdiction (including for preliminary
rulings) over the interpretation of EU customs legislation; the rules of the single
market in goods as far as they apply under the backstop; VAT and excise rules;
agriculture and environment; the single electricity market; and state aid (Articles 8
-12 of the Protocol).
The backstop will apply until the UK and the EU have reached an agreement over
their final relationship that will supersede the backstop (Article 1 of the Protocol); or
until the Joint Committee decides that the Protocol is no longer necessary (Article 20
of the Protocol). How long this will be the case, is entirely unclear at this moment.
The arbitration problem
While the jurisdiction of the ECJ concerning the UK is highly sensitive politically, it
does not pose particular legal difficulties under EU or UK law.
By contrast, the dispute settlement mechanism for disputes between the EU and the
UK over the interpretation and application of the WA itself, is more problematic. The
default rule in this regard is that disputes should be resolved through cooperation
and consultation, which would happen in the Joint Committee (Article 169 WA).
Where no agreed solution can be reached, either party to the WA may request the
establishment of an arbitration panel.  It should be noted that this had not been part
of the earlier (Commission) draft of the WA and can be considered a negotiating
success for the UK which had been pressing for an arbitration mechanism (instead
of the ECJ as the ultimate arbiter).
This construction, however, raises considerable constitutional problems under
EU law as it might be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order. The
autonomy of EU law – meaning that it is an independent legal order – goes back as
far as van Gend en Loos and finds its most basic exposition – as far as EU external
relations are concerned – in Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement. The the ECJ
ruled that it was generally permissible for an agreement concluded by the EU to
provide for its own dispute settlement system, but that there were two specific limits
if the agreement was based on and referred to concepts of Union law resulting from
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Articles 19 TEU and 344 TFEU: first, only the ECJ is in a position to determine the
division of competences between the EU and its Member States; and second, only
the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret EU law if that interpretation is binding in the EU
or its Member States.
Given that the WA is to a large extent based on EU law concepts, any dispute
resolution mechanism that would allow for an interpretation of these concepts in a
way that was binding on the EU, would have to be found contrary to the autonomy of
EU law.  The drafters of the WA were of course aware of this problem and included
Article 174 WA:
1. Where a dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with this Title
raises a question of interpretation of a concept of Union law, a question of
interpretation of a provision of Union law referred to in this Agreement or a
question of whether the United Kingdom has complied with its obligations
under Article 89(2), the arbitration panel shall not decide on any such
question. In such case, it shall request the Court of Justice of the European
Union to give a ruling on the question.
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give
such a ruling which shall be binding on the arbitration panel.  […]
2. Without prejudice to the first sentence of the first subparagraph of
paragraph 1, if the Union or the United Kingdom considers that a request
in accordance with paragraph 1 is to be made, it may make submissions to
the arbitration panel to that effect. In such case, the arbitration panel shall
submit the request in accordance with paragraph 1 unless the question
raised does not concern the interpretation of a concept of Union law,
interpretation of a provision of Union law referred to in this Agreement,
or does not concern whether the United Kingdom has complied with its
obligations under Article 89(2). […]
This provision would seem to preserve the autonomy of EU law by excluding
questions of EU law from the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel.
In light of Opinion 2/13 on the EU’s ill-fated accession to the ECHR, one can
doubt whether this solution will do the trick. Let’s recall that the envisaged prior
involvement of the ECJ was one of the (many) reasons the ECJ considered the draft
agreement on EU accession to the ECHR to violate the autonomy principle. Under
the agreement the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would have had to
decide whether to allow the ECJ to render its own prior decision in a case pending
before the ECtHR if it had not already had given a ruling on the matter in question. 
This, the ECJ ruled, was not permissible under the EU Treaties because it “would be
tantamount to conferring on [the ECtHR] jurisdiction to interpret the case-law of the
Court of Justice.”
Even though Article 174 WA does not require consideration of the ECJ’s case law,
there are obvious parallels in that the arbitral tribunal will have jurisdiction to decide
whether Union law is at issue or not. This decision can only be made by interpreting
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Union law – at least in a superficial manner; and any such interpretation would be
binding on the EU.
As many commentators pointed out after Opinion 2/13 was released, this conception
of the autonomy of EU law is particularly (and unhelpfully) strict and unnecessary.
Nonetheless, it stands and the ECJ’s recent decision in Achmea confirmed the ECJ’s
strict and defensive stance on all matters concerning its own jurisdiction.
Should this worry the parties to the agreement? No one has yet suggested that
the WA be referred to the ECJ under Article 218 (11) TFEU; and anyhow the WA
may well not survive the next couple of weeks politically. But even after its entry
into force, the ECJ would have jurisdiction to incidentally review the compatibility of
any EU international agreement with the Treaties.  Whether it will have the courage
to strike parts of it down when so much is at stake politically is of course another
question.
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